Central Stability or Unstable Decentralization? Why Enforcement is Unstable in Decentralized Governments
In: Internationalisierung des Rechts und seine ökonomische Analyse, S. 691-704
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In: Internationalisierung des Rechts und seine ökonomische Analyse, S. 691-704
In many countries administrative procedures have been identified as a major obstacle to private investments and economic growth. Without overtly questioning the substantive aspects of government regulations, critics of the current state of administrative procedure challenge its complicated details and the time that applications and their decisions consume. Some of the literature dealing with administration as the agent of politics picks up the question of how public administrations and administered individuals interact strategically in the administrative process. Most often this line of research concentrates on regulated utilities and government procurement. However, there is hardly any theoretical economic basis for the study of one of the most important, if not the most important, aspects of administrative procedure: the adjudication in bulk of applications for permissions or similar (very often dichotomous) government decisions. Such decisions en masse often are not made within strategic settings, as is usually—and quite appropriately—assumed in the literature on government regulation of public utilities etc. Instead, with masses of applicants filing applications and many administrators deciding upon them, strategic interaction is unlikely to occur: no single applicant expects to be able to influence the investigative behavior of the administrators, no single administrator expects to influence the behavior of the average applicant. Thus, adaptive behavior prevails on both sides of the interaction. All individuals will adapt to the expected, viz. average, behavior of their counterparts. A model for this side of administrative procedure is missing. It is the goal of this paper to develop a first step in this direction.
BASE
In: International review of law and economics, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 381-411
ISSN: 0144-8188
Mit der Implementierung des Bestellerprinzips - wer den Makler beauftragt, mußs ihn auch bezahlen - hat der Gesetzgeber einen Wechsel der Zahllast für die Courtage vom Mieter zum Vermieter vorgenommen. Ob die intendierte Entlastung der Mieter gelingt, hängt maßgeblich vom Grad der Überwälzung auf die Miete ab. Auf der Verliererseite werden die Makler sein, da sie mit einer geringeren Nachfrage sowie einer Erosion der Courtage rechnen müssen. ; Real estate agents (REAs) brokering rent contracts in Germany charged fees only to tenants but not to landlords until 2015. In order to relieve tenants from this burden, German law now requires REAs to only charge landlords. We suggest three reasons for why landlords' brokerage fees are not simply passed on to tenants but declined substantially after the legal change as did the amount of brokering of rent contracts. REAs' bargaining power declined when landlords replaced tenants as bargaining partner. Brokerage fees to be paid by tenants serve as a self-selection mechanism of long term tenants. REAs' incentives to provide high quality decline when the price is fixed before they produce their service.
BASE
In: Public Governance und schwache Interessen, S. 127-139
In: International review of law and economics, Band 22, Heft 4, S. 511-526
ISSN: 0144-8188
In: International review of law and economics, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 285-299
ISSN: 0144-8188